First info on conference program
Open Lecture
Patrick HAGGARD (UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience):
The neuroscience of human volition: Could the brain have 'free will'? 'free will'?
Other lectures:
· John-Dylan Haynes – Unconscious determinants of human decisions
· George Northoff - The self and its body - Our "material me"
· Atsushi Iriki - Hierarchical classes of tools as externalization of motor and sensory body-parts
· Yann Coello - Embodied perception and space consciousness and space consciousness
· India Morrison - Neural mechanisms of social touch
· Sukhvinder Obhi - Action awareness, agency and intentional binding
· Jean-Luc Petit - Are we the victims of guesswork by a Bayesian brain machine?
· Włodzisław Duch - Imagery Agnosia: what goes on in my head?
· Massimiliano Cappuccio – Motor intentionality and the frame problem
· Corrado Sinigaglia – The body and its selves
· Lawrence M. Parsons - TBA
· Francesca Morganti - TBA
· Stein Braten - TBA
· Sean A. Spence – TBA
· Joanna Trzópek – Problem of conscious will: Are we indeed authors of our actions?
· Anna Wieczorek - The Basolateral amygdala as a part of neuronal circuity activated during learning
· Aneta Brzezicka - Memory and reasoning processes in depression: The Role of Frontal Alpha Asymmetry
· Conference Symposium on BCI:
· Brain - Computer Interfaces: from science-fiction to practice:
· Piotr DURKA - Brain - Computer Interfaces: from sci-fi to 7FP
· (introduction on BCI paradigms P300, SSVEP i ERD/S and also on EEG)
· Niels BIRBAUMER - Brain Computer Communication in Paralysis and Behavioral Disorders
Are we the victims of guesswork by a Bayesian brain-machine?
Jean-Luc PETIT
Université de Strasbourg
& Laboratoire de Physiologie
de la Perception et de l’Action (Collège de France)
Despite the fact that we remain stubborn ontologists regarding our ego, the things in the world and other persons, leading-edge science thinks otherwise. Not only has quantum mechanics helped us to get rid of the material objects on their spatiotemporal trajectories classical mechanism pretended to trace, even psychology and the human sciences, in their new neuroscientific attires, embrace a frustratingly non-committed view of the substantiality of the world's denizens. From now on, it seems that no category of our perception of objects is entitled to more than the provisional status of an arbitrary posit in the course of constant reappraisal. The diffusion of a probabilistic model of brain processing in labs tends to undermine the phenomenological typology of habitually anticipated entities in human perception, action, desire, and belief: the things, the own body, the other persons. Is such a trend mere illusion of fashion or strict science forcing its way through a crowd of superstitious hypostatizations?