Neurobiological data & Husserlian constitution - I
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 : 281–298, 2003.
© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
On the relation between recent neurobiological data on
perception (and action) and the Husserlian theory of constitution
JEAN-LUC PETIT
Université Marc Bloch (Strasbourg) and Collège de France, Laboratoire de Physiologie de
l’Action et de la Perception (UMR C9950 CNRS, Paris)
Received 12 July 2002; received in revised version 2 February 2003
Abstract. The phenomenological theory of constitution promises a solution for “the problem
of consciousness” insofar as it changes the traditional terms of this problem by systematically
correlating “subject” and “object” in the unifying context of intentional acts. I argue
that embodied constitution must depend upon the role of kinesthesia as a constitutive operator.
In pursuing the path of intentionality in its descent from an idealistic level of “pure” constitution
to this fully embodied kinesthetic constitution, we are able to gain access to different
ontological regions such as physical thing, owned body and shared world. Neuroscience brings
to light the somatological correlates of noemata. Bridging the gap between incarnation and
naturalisation represents the best way of realizing the foundational program of transcendental
phenomenology.
Key words: action, constitution, kinesthesia, mirror neurons, plasticity
Introduction
Progress in the contemporary sciences of the brain still remains quite ambiguous.
To be sure, a good many prejudices concerning the functioning of the brain
have been dismantled. No one now believes in the brain as an organ genetically
fixed in its anatomical structure, its homuncular or retinotopical topography,
nor in its functioning, as an organ which is essentially receptive and
reactive and which functions as a link between environmental stimuli and
physical movements, strictly compartmentalised and ordered in a hierarchy
reaching from peripheral receptors to the associative centres and from there
to motor activity, etc. These prejudices have not withstood the onslaught of
evidence relating to the epigenetic variability of the cerebral network, to the
flexibility, modified by usage, of the synaptic connections, nor that of the
activational potential of the neuronal network, whether spontaneous or induced,
whether preparatory, or anticipatory, whether concerned with the projection
of hypotheses or decisions, or with the internal simulation of actions,
events or external processes. These transformations have made it possible for
the neurosciences to gain access to the higher activities of the human mind
and in so doing have opened the way to the cognitive neurosciences.
Does this mean that the phenomenology of our conscious experience, until
now solely accessible in its meaning (even in its expressible meaning) to
the reflective approach of phenomenological (or analytical) philosophy can
now be dealt with in parallel from the standpoint of the biological processes
which underlie and run parallel to this level of meaning? A certain popular
literature has sought to furnish a short and dogmatic response to this question:
the biology of the brain has up till now disregarded the mind – from now
on it will explain it! It is our contention that another reply is possible. Starting
out from the Husserlian theory of the transcendental constitution of the
meaning of the being of objects we are beginning to find in recent neuroscientific
evidence, and in new fields of research, quite definite parallels which make
it possible for us to propose an alternative solution to that of dogmatic
reductionism. The rootedness of the possibility of meaning in a corporeal
experience rests upon the presupposition of the existence of a particular somatological
organisation which is, so to speak, the contingent apriori of the
field of meaning. The mechanisms brought to light by the neurosciences seem
to me to present valid candidates for this function. For the neurosciences can
be integrated into the foundational programme of transcendental constitution.
In response to the demand for an ultimate explanation, the philosopher today
can, as never before, fall back upon those circuits and schemas of cerebral
activation which stand in correlation to perception and action. The optimistic
conclusion is the following: instead of abolishing the transcendental project,
the naturalisation process can contribute to its fulfilment. The world of experience
is endowed with meaning by us: the contingent organisation of our
nature has made this possible. Can this hypothesis be justified? And are we
entitled to push matters even further than this?
Let us be more definite about our ultimate ambitions. In fact, what we idealize
is a functional neurodynamics for the constitution of one’s own body,
and more broadly, a functional neurodynamics for the transcendental constitution
of a world of meaningful experience through constitutive operations
such that the subject itself can perform them with its own body. Let me clarify
matters further. A rapidly growing body of discoveries in the specialized domain
of brain cartography has been transforming the traditional dispute between
phenomenology and positive science regarding the adequate treatment
of the body into an obsolete quarrel – even though most philosophers remain
as yet ignorant of this development. Up to now, phenomenology has been used
to call attention to the difference (not without dramatizing the conflict) between
the fixity of the anatomical structure of the physical body (Körper) and
the free fluidity of the meaning patterns of the subjective experience of one’s
own body (Leib). From now on, the critical question should be: whether or
not such a contrast is on the point of disappearing altogether. In fact, neuroscience
has resolutely shaken off its former belief in a rigidly somatotopic
representation of the peripheral organs of the body within the frontiers of a
definite somatosensory mapping of the territories of the centro-parietal cortex
and thalamus. Accordingly, a new methodological approach is forcing its
way through brain science labs, putting on their common agenda the setting
up of a global online recording of constantly moving functional activation
patterns. These constantly changing patterns distribute themselves over varying
regions of cerebral tissue at a rate determined both by the performance of
the behavioral tasks and the ability of the system to recruit the necessary cerebral
resources. Such representational plasticity, far from being genetically
predetermined in all its localizational specifics, proves itself to be induced,
shaped and modulated to a considerable extent by the unique experience of
the organism in its environment. Laying our bet on the chances of a new relationship
between phenomenology and objective science, we want to take
advantage of the opportunities created by these developments. And (assuming
some speculative license) we want to coordinate the flow of functional
activity of the brain with the flow of lived experience of the body in an attempt
to bridge (or at least narrow down) the gap between activation patterns
and meaning patterns, the assumption being that they are mutually indispensable
correlates underlying the auto-affection of the acting person.
But such a phenomenological reinterpretation of the biological data only
covers one half of our program, the second half of which consists in a reinterpretation
of phenomenology itself. The traditional criticism of that brand of
phenomenology known as transcendental constitution is directed at an alleged
submission of all meaning formations in the life world to the sense giving
power of a Cartesian cogito, a move that turns this cogito into a kind of creative
god, and that makes an enigma of the rootedness of our meaningful experience
in the body. Such criticism may have had some credibility thirty years
ago. But, nowadays, after the transcription and publication of the bulk of
Husserl’s manuscripts in the Husserliana series, this position can no longer
be sustained. We have enough evidence of the constant efforts made by Husserl
in his later work, to affirm unhesitatingly that a transcendental (i.e. subject
relative) constitution of the sense of being is not only compatible with, but
also actually requires a corporeal embodiment of the constitutive operations
through which the objects of experience are endowed with meaning. On the
one hand, the constitutive operations have been transformed into real actions
of which we can be fully conscious as we accomplish the relevant movements.
On the other hand, the somewhat disembodied activity of the cogito has been
integrated into the fully concrete somatosensory experience of kinesthetic
systems through which we are aware of and control our movements. As a result,
the promotion of kinesthesia to the status of the principal operator in the process
of constitution has meant that the role of the body has been generalized to
each and every dimension of our daily experience of a world uniquely peopled
by the products of constitutive operations. So that the body, and not the
cogito, traditionally conceived as an abstract reference lacking in any material
substratum, has turned out to be the true pivotal center around which all
our subjective experience of a meaningful world revolves. Returning to
the neurosciences, the gap that we try to bridge is reducible to a semantic
difference between two expressions: the “modulation by experience” that
neuroscientists postulate as the contribution of the somatosensory system
to perception, and the “constitution by experience” that transcendental phenomenology
views as the contribution of kinesthesia to the perceived world.
Two conceptions of consciousness
Consciousness in act
When we are actively engaged with something, we are directed towards this
thing which thereby becomes our object. The thing is there, right at the centre
of our attention. We are directed toward it. We apply ourselves to it. We are
absorbed in it. Even though we remain fully alert we are, so to speak, deflected,
torn away from ourselves. In not being present to ourselves we are for this
very reason both absent from ourselves and present to something which is not
our self. This experience of being outside ourselves and of being integrated
into something external to ourselves is experienced as both fascinating and
upsetting, something obscurely felt as a threat to our intellectual comfort.
In the philosophical tradition, few authors (and rarely in all parts of their
work) have succeeded in successfully overcoming the peculiar difficulty of
grasping this consciousness in act, especially if one considers how important
it is not to water it down and then replace it with something which has little to
do with it. For in fact we are exposed to all kinds of pressures and to all kinds
of temptations which lead us to dogmatically reduce our approximate and
indicative forms of expression to a pseudo rational norm and so to objectify
and substantialise or hypostatize them, by arbitrarily imposing topical and
demarcational distinctions: there is an outside and an inside, physical things
outside and their mental representations inside, etc.
Consciousness as a place
The understandable determination to take up a stand on something solid and
to enjoy the reassuring certainty of dealing with something real has led many
philosophers to give up trying to grasp this consciousness in act. They preferred
to delimit an area which they could arrange as they pleased by populating
it with objects of a certain type, a rather peculiar type certainly, but which
could be treated in accordance with a standard method. Locke launched this
tradition by interpreting Descartes discovery of the cogito in his own way.
Getting rid of the act as much too ephemeral he opened the way to any future
psychology by transforming human mentality into an interior space: tabula
rasa, a blank sheet of paper, the mirror of external objects . . .
Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind. . . Light and sound
force an entrance into the mind. . . The ideas come into the mind. . . There are such ideas
in men’s minds . . .The furniture of the yet empty cabinet (Locke 1961, I, p. 19).
This problematic of inside-outside, which comes down to systematically rejecting
the act character of consciousness and replacing it with a spatialised
fantasy confirmed by an obsession with boundaries has resurfaced today via
the representational theory of mind espoused by analytical philosophy and –
under its influence – cognitive science. The only valid question now appears
to be whether we have conscious access (awareness) to certain internal events
(Fourneret and Jeannerod 1998; Libet et al. 1983).